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Abstract. With the growing scale and complexity of high-performance
computing (HPC) systems, resilience solutions that ensure continuity
of service despite frequent errors and component failures must be me-
thodically designed to balance the reliability requirements with the over-
heads to performance and power. Design patterns enable a structured
approach to the development of resilience solutions, providing hardware
and software designers with the building block elements for the rapid
development of novel solutions and for adapting existing technologies
for emerging, extreme-scale HPC environments. In this paper, we de-
velop analytical models that enable designers to evaluate the reliability
and performance characteristics of the design patterns. These models
are particularly useful in building a unified framework that analyzes and
compares various resilience solutions built using a combination of pat-
terns.
Keywords: high-performance computing, resilience, patterns, performance, re-
liability, modeling
1 Introduction
Many of the choices that drive hardware and software component designs in
emerging extreme-scale high-performance computing (HPC) systems are made
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to deliver maximum application performance, but are also subject to the con-
straints of cost, power and reliability. While HPC system architectures have
evolved significantly over the past decade, these constraints are expected to force
further dramatic changes to the system stack to achieve exascale performance.
Recent system architectures have emphasized increasing on-chip and node-level
parallelism in addition to complex memory architectures consisting of deeper
hierarchies and diverse technologies [12]. The software infrastructure, including
the system software, middleware and tools, has continued to evolve to keep up
with these changes to the system architectures to drive application performance
on these extreme-scale computers.
The reliability and availability of the recent generation of HPC systems have
been degrading in comparison to their predecessors [6]. This trend is projected to
cause future extreme-scale systems to experience unprecedented rates of faults,
which will make it difficult to accomplish productive work. The increasingly
complex, multicomponent hardware and software environment only makes the
challenge of detection of faults in a timely manner, containment of error prop-
agation and mitigation of the impact of error and failure events more difficult.
Resilience solutions must protect the correctness of HPC applications in the pres-
ence of faults, errors and failures arising from a multitude of sources, including
the system environment, the interactions between platform hardware and system
software components and applications, and variability in behavior of hardware
components, while seeking to limit the performance and power overhead they
impose on the system.
To navigate the complexities of this emerging landscape of HPC design, we
proposed a structured approach to designing HPC resilience solutions based
on the concept of design patterns [9]. In general, a design pattern is a general
reusable solution to a commonly occurring problem within a given context in
any design discipline. A pattern provides a description or template for how to
solve a problem that may be adapted to specific context. Resilience patterns de-
scribe solutions to confront faults and their consequences. The patterns describe
techniques for detection, containment and mitigation of faults, errors and failure
events. They can be instantiated at any layer of the system stack. The resilience
design patterns serve as building block elements for designing complete solu-
tions, and are useful for the exploration of design alternatives for a target HPC
system environment and application workload. Section 2 describes the concept
of patterns and summarizes the different types of resilience patterns that are
organized in a catalog.
The development of resilience solutions through composition of various design
patterns lends structure to the design and implementation process by compelling
designers to consider the key issues of protection coverage, fault model, handling
capability, etc. However, objectively selecting pattern solutions that have been
examined and utilized successfully in a specific context with the intention of
adapting them to a new architecture or software environment of a future system
requires criteria based on a quantitative foundation. Mathematical models of
hardware or software components, or even entire HPC systems, which are solved
either analytically or through discrete event simulation, are useful to HPC de-
signers for predicting resilient behavior of the system in the presence of various
fault, error and failure events, without having to build the component or system.
This paper develops models for analytical evaluation of reliability and perfor-
mance measures of the various resilience design patterns in our pattern catalog.
These models are presented in Section 3. The models are designed to capture
the interaction between the resilient behavior and the performance overhead
incurred by instantiating a specific pattern. Section 4 discusses approaches to
calculate reliability and performance of a solution built by combining several
patterns.
2 Background: Resilience Design Patterns
2.1 Concept
Design patterns identify the key aspects of a solution to common problem, and
presents the solution in the form of an abstract description, which provides de-
signers with guidelines on how to address the problem. Patterns capture the
best-known techniques to solve a problem. We developed resilience design pat-
terns [9] to support a systematic approach to designing and implementing new
resilience solutions and adapting existing solutions to future extreme-scale ar-
chitectures and software environments.
The patterns describe the design decisions and trade-offs that must be con-
sidered when applying a pattern solution to a specific context. The descriptions
encourage designers to reason about the impact of applying a solution on a
system’s performance scalability and power consumption overhead as well as
consider implementation issues. Based on the patterns, we developed a frame-
work that enables designers to comprehensively evaluate the scope of protection
domain and the handling efficiency of resilience solutions.
The basic template of a resilience design pattern is defined in an event-driven
paradigm, in which each resilience design pattern consists of a behavior and a
set of activation and response interfaces. The patterns present solutions to spe-
cific problems in detecting, recovering from, or masking a fault, error or failure
event. The pattern descriptions are abstract and they may be implemented by
HPC applications’ algorithms, numerical libraries, system software, or even in
the hardware architectures. We have organized the resilience design pattern as a
catalog that contains detailed descriptions of the patterns. The catalog is avail-
able as a specification document [8], in which each resilience pattern is presented
using a structured format to enable designers to quickly discover whether the
pattern solution is suitable to the problem being solved.
2.2 Classification
We developed a pattern classification scheme that organizes the resilience pat-
terns in a layered hierarchy, in which each level addresses a specific aspect of
the problem. The classification enables designers to separately reason about the
patterns that define the scope of the protection domain and those that define
the semantics of the detection, containment and mitigation. The hierarchical
organization of the patterns permits system architects to work on the overall
organization of the solutions by analyzing the integration of various resilience
patterns across the system stack while designers of individual hardware and
software components can focus on implementation of the patterns.
Resilience in the context of HPC systems and its applications has two key di-
mensions: (1) forward progress of the system; (2) data consistency in the system.
Based on these factors, we organize the resilience design patterns into two major
categories, state patterns and behavioral patterns. The behavioral patterns
identify detection, containment, or mitigation actions that enable a system to
cope with the presence of a fault, error, or failure event. These patterns are orga-
nized hierarchically and they include strategy, architectural and structural
patterns.
The strategy patterns define high-level polices of a resilience solution. Their
descriptions are deliberately abstract to enable hardware and software architects
to reason about the overall organization of the techniques used and their impli-
cations on the full system design. These patterns describe the overall structure of
the solution and the key attributes of the solution and their capabilities indepen-
dent of the layer of system stack and hardware/software architectural features.
The architectural patterns convey specific methods necessary for the construc-
tion of a resilience solution. They explicitly convey the type of fault, error or
failure event that they handle and provide detail about the key components and
connectors that make up the solution. The structural patterns provide concrete
descriptions of the solution rather than high-level strategies. They comprise of
instructions that may be implemented in hardware/software components. While
the strategy and architectural patterns serve to provide designers with a clear
overall framework of a solution and the type of events that it can handle, the
structural patterns express the details so they can contribute to the development
of complete working solutions.
2.3 Designing Resilience Solutions using Patterns
Each pattern in the resilience design pattern catalog presents a solution to a
specific problem in detecting, containing or mitigating a fault, error or failure
event. In order to construct complete resilience solutions designers must identify
patterns that provide each of these capabilities and apply them to a well-defined
protection domain. Therefore, a complete solution consists of at least one state
pattern (defining scope of the protection domain), and one or more behavioral
patterns (supporting a combination of detection, containment and mitigation
solutions).
For hardware and software designers to make practical use these patterns in
the development of resilient versions of their designs, we have developed a design
framework that a set of guidelines are necessary to combine the patterns and
refine their implementations. The framework is based on design spaces that are
arranged in a hierarchy. By working through the design spaces, designers can
convert initial outline of the resilience solution into a concrete implementation
by considering the layer of abstraction for the pattern implementation, scala-
bility of the solution, portability to other architectures, dependencies on any
hardware/software features, flexibility to adapt the solution to accelerated fault
rates, capability to handle other types of fault and error events, the performance
and performance overheads.
3 Reliability and Performance Models for Resilience
Design Patterns
The models are intended to be useful for predicting the reliability and per-
formance characteristics of solutions built using design patterns in a notional
extreme-scale system that may use different plausible architectures and config-
urations that consist of different node counts, and may use different software
environments. Therefore, we present the analytic models for the various archi-
tecture patterns in our catalog because these patterns explicitly specify the type
of event that they handle and convey details about the handling capabilities and
the components that make up the solution in a manner independent of the layer
of system stack and hardware/software architectural features. For the checkpoint
and rollback pattern, we present models for the derivative structural patterns
due to their widespread use in HPC environments. The models for the patterns
provide a quantitative analysis of the costs and benefits of instantiating specific
resilience design patterns. The models may be applied to an individual hardware
or software component, which is a sub-system, or to a full system that consists
of a collection of nodes capable of running a parallel application.
Although the future extreme-scale systems may not look at all like the sys-
tems of today, we assume that the notional system consists of multiple processing
nodes, and that the parallel application partitions the work among tasks that
run on these nodes that cooperate via message passing to synchronize. There-
fore, we use the following notation in the descriptions of the models: N : number
of tasks/processes in the parallel application; M : total number of messages ex-
changed between the tasks/processes of the application; P : the number of pro-
cessors in the system; Tsystem: the operation time of the system, or the execution
time of an application.
In general, we assume that the event (whether fault, error or failure) arrivals
follow a Poisson process, the probability of an event is F(t). The reliability of
the system is:
R(t) = 1− F (t) (1)
which indicates the probability that the system operates correctly for time t.
If the scope of the system captured by the state pattern has an exponential
event distribution, the reliability of the system takes the form:
R(t) = 1− e−t/η (2)
where η is the mean time to interrupt of the system, which may be calculated
as the inverse of the failure rate of the system.
3.1 Fault Diagnosis Pattern Model
The fault diagnosis pattern identifies the presence of the fault and tries to de-
termine its root cause. Until a fault has not activated into an error it does not
affect the correct operation of the system, and therefore the pattern makes an
assessment about the presence of a defect based on observed behavior of one or
more system parameters. To incorporate this pattern in an HPC environment
requires inclusion of a monitoring component. The pattern uses either effect-
cause or cause-effect analysis on the observed parameters of a monitored system
to infer the presence of a fault. The performance overhead of this pattern may
be expressed as:
Tsystem = T0 +
n∑
k=1
tinference/β (3)
where n is the number of observed parameters of the monitored system and β
is the frequency of polling the monitored system. Since the pattern only identifies
faults, but does not remedy them, there is no tangible improvement in reliability
of the system when this pattern is instantiated.
3.2 Reconfiguration Pattern Model
The reconfiguration pattern entails modification of the interconnection between
components in a system, such that isolates the component affected by a fault,
error or failure event, preventing it from affecting the correct operation of the
overall system. The pattern may cause the system to assume one of several valid
configurations that are functionally equivalent to the original system configura-
tion, but results in system operation at a degraded performance level.
To simplify the derivation of the reliability and performance models, we as-
sume that the system consists of n identical components. The performance of
the system for the loss of a single component may be expressed as:
Tsystem = TFF + (1 − TFF ).
n− 1
n
+ TR (4)
where TFF represents the operational time before the occurrence of the event,
and TR is the system downtime on account of the delay for reconfiguring the
n-1 components.
The reliability of the system may be expressed as:
R(n, t) = 1−
n∏
i=1
(1−Ri(t)) (5)
This equation assumes that the fault events are independent and are expo-
nentially distributed.
3.3 Rollback Recovery Pattern Model
The checkpoint-recovery architectural pattern is based on the creation of snap-
shots of the system state and maintenance of these checkpoints on a persistent
storage system during the error- or failure-free operation of the system. Upon
detection of an error or a failure, the checkpoints/logged events are used to
recreate last known error- or failure-free state of the system, after which the sys-
tem operation is restarted. The rollback recovery pattern is a derivative of the
checkpoint-recovery provides rollback recovery, i.e., based on a temporal view of
the system’s progress, the system state recreated during the recovery process is
a previous correct version of the state of the system.
The pattern requires interruption of the system during error or failure-free
operation to record the checkpoint, which incurs an overhead. Therefore, the
operational lifetime of the system can be partitioned into distinct phases, which
include the regular execution phase (o), the interval for creating checkpoints (δ),
and the interval for recovery upon occurrence of an event (γ) to account for the
operational state lost on account of the event.
The performance of the system in absence of any error or failure events may
be expressed as:
Tsystem = o+ δ/r (6)
where r is the rate of checkpointing.
The performance of the system in the presence of failure events, assuming an
exponential event rate of e−t/η (η is the mean time to interrupt of the system)
may be modeled as:
Tsystem = (TFF + γ)/η (7)
where TFF = o + δ/r
The reliability of a system using the rollback recovery pattern may be mod-
eled as:
R(t) = 1− e−(TFF+γ)/η (8)
for systems in which an event occurs before the interval TFF + γ, and η is
the mean time to interrupt.
3.4 Roll-Forward Recovery Pattern Model
The roll-forward pattern is a structural pattern, which is also a derivative of the
checkpoint recovery pattern. It uses either checkpointing or log-based protocols
to record system progress during error- or failure-free operation. The recovery
entails the use of checkpointed state and/or logging information to recreate a
stable version of the system identical to the one right before the error or failure
occurred. The roll-forward pattern may also use online recovery protocols that
use inference methods to recreate state.
The roll-forward pattern also requires the system to record system and/or
message state during fault-free operation. The system performance may be cal-
culated using:
Tsystem = o+ δ/r (9)
where r is the rate of checkpointing or message logging.
The performance of the system in the presence of failure events may be
captured using:
Tsystem = (TFF + γ)/η (10)
where TFF = o + δ/r.
When the roll-forward pattern instantiation uses message logging, the term
δ in these equations is calculated as the logging interval: δ = M . tlogging .
The reliability of the system that uses the rollforward pattern capability may
be modeled as:
R(t) = 1− e−(TFF+M.tlogging)/η[for message logging implementations]
= 1− e−(TFF+γ)/η[for checkpointing implementations]
(11)
assuming an exponential event arrival and η is the mean time to interrupt of
the system.
3.5 Redundancy Pattern Model
The redundancy pattern is based on a strategy of compensation since it entails
creation of a group of N replicas of a system. The replicated versions of the system
are used in various configurations to compensate for errors or failures in one of
the system replicas, including fail-over, active comparison for error detection,
or majority voting for detection and correction by excluding the replica whose
outputs fall outside the majority. The use of the redundancy pattern incurs
overhead to the system operation independent of whether an error or failure
event occurs.
For parallel application, the overhead depends on the scope of replication,
which may include aspects such as the amount of computation performed by
the tasks, the communication between them, etc. The overhead also depends
on factors such as the degree of redundancy, placement of the replicas on the
system resources. Therefore, to develop a precise mathematical model that rep-
resents each of these factors is complex. To simplify the analysis, we partition
the operation time of the system into the ratio of the time spent on the redun-
dant operation A and the time . This partitioning can be logically defined by
the scope of the state patterns; (1 - A) is the fraction outside the scope of the
state pattern, for which no redundancy is applied. Since the term t is taken as
the base execution time of the application, the time A.t is the time of system
operation for which redundancy is applied, while (1 - A).t is the remaining time.
The term d refers to the degree of redundancy, i.e., the number of copies of the
pattern behavior that are replicated.
Tsystem = TS.((1 −A) + β.A)) + TMV (12)
where β is 1 when the state pattern is replicated in a space redundant manner
and is equal to d when applied in a time redundant manner. The term TS is
serial operation time of the system and the term TMV represents the time spent
by the majority voting logic to detect output mismatches.
Assuming the mean time to interrupt of the system that uses the redundancy
pattern is λ, then the reliability of the system may expressed as:
R(t) = 1−
d∏
i=1
t/λ = 1− (t/λ)d (13)
3.6 Design Diversity Pattern Model
When a design bug exists in a system design or configuration, an error or fail-
ure during system operation is often unavoidable. Therefore, the detection and
mitigation of the impact of such errors or failures is critical. The n-version de-
sign pattern applies distinct implementations of the same design specification
created by different individuals or teams. The N versions of the system are
operated simultaneously with a majority voting logic is used to compare the
results produced by each design version. Due the low likelihood that different
individuals or teams make identical errors in their respective implementations,
the pattern enables compensating for errors or failures caused by a bug in any
one implementation version.
Assuming that there are n versions of the system scope encapsulated by the
state pattern, 1 ≥ i ≤ n, then the probability that only version i executes its
function correctly while the remaining versions produce an incorrect outcome:
P (A) =
n+1∑
k=1
P (Ak) (14)
where the P(Ak) is the probability that only the version Ak out of the n
versions produces the correct outcome, while the remaining versions produce an
incorrect outcome.
The probability density function (PDF) describing the probability of failure
occurring during the system operation may be expressed as:
P (t) = ((1 − P (V ))
n+1∑
k=1
P (Ak) + P (V )) (15)
where the P(V) represents the probability that the majority voting procedure
cannot select the correct result from at least two correct versions. Therefore, the
reliability of the system using the n-version design at time t may be calculated
in terms of this probability:
R(t) = 1− ((1− P (V ))
n+1∑
k=1
P (Ak) + P (V )).F (t) (16)
where F(t) = e−t/η is the failure rate assuming exponential event arrival rate.
4 Model-based Evaluation of Resilience
The design of complete resilience solutions often requires the composition of
multiple resilience design patterns. In a complex HPC environment with numer-
ous hardware and software pattern instantiations in the various components,
the resilience to different fault events is managed by this well-defined system
of patterns. To developed a combined evaluation of the reliability and perfor-
mance characteristics of a real system that consists of several pattern solutions
implemented across the system stack requires composition of the pattern models.
For the simplified case of a system configuration that consists of N indepen-
dent components or tasks such that, if any one of the system components or
tasks fails, the entire system fails, the overall reliability of the system may be
modeled as:
Rsystem = R1 ×R2 ×R3 × ...RN (17)
where the reliability Ri of a component is a function of the resilience pattern that
it instantiates. For such a configuration, the performance overhead of applying
patterns to the N components in the system is additive.
For more intricate analytic evaluation of the performance and reliability,
more complex models must be developed. There are several paradigms that
are useful for this purpose, including fault trees, block diagrams, reliability &
task graphs, Markov & semi-Markov chains, stochastic Petrinets, etc. Analytical
models that use Markov models are useful to model the intricate dependencies
between the pattern solutions in a complex multicomponent HPC environment.
Markov chains are state-space-based methods that consist of states represent-
ing various conditions associated with the system, and the transition between
states, which represent the changes in system state or configuration due to the
occurrence of a simple or compound event such as the malfunction or failure
of one or more components in the system. The assessment of system resilience
using Markov models for a multicomponent HPC environment that experiences
different modes of faults, as well as a model for the combined evaluation of
performance and reliability is the subject of ongoing research.
5 Related Work
Much research has been done on modeling techniques and tools that are useful
for reliability and performance analysis of various computing systems and ap-
plications. These approaches may broadly be categorized into [11]: (i) structural
modeling, which highlights the relationships between the system components us-
ing representations such as block diagrams, reliability graphs and fault trees.
These models assume stochastic independence between system components; (ii)
state-space models, which model the dependencies among system components
and use representations such as Markov chains. These models are significantly
more complex due to the need for as many as 2n states in the Markov represen-
tation for n system components; and, (iii) hierarchical models, which balance the
speed of analysis with the accuracy of the model by combining abstract struc-
tural models with the detailed Markov models [7]. There have also been several
advances in performability analysis, which aim to model the interaction between
failure recovery behavior and performance in a composite manner [1] [13].
Due to the dominance of checkpoint and rollback approaches in high-performance
computing systems, several approaches have been proposed for calculating the
reliability and performance measures of systems that use this solution. Ana-
lytic models have been developed for determining the optimum intervals for
checkpoints [14]. For applying such analysis to large-scale cluster-based HPC
systems, the model has been adapted to meet the goal of minimizing the overall
application run time [2]. For understanding the viability of rollback recovery
on extreme-scale systems, models for prediction of its performance have been
proposed. This model was developed to evaluate the rollback recovery solution
for petascale HPC systems [5]. An optimal checkpoint and rollback model has
been devised that incorporates a reliability function obtained from the anal-
ysis of historical failure data from the system event log files [10]. There have
also been efforts to develop models that analyze the combination of checkpoint
restart with redundancy techniques for MPI applications [4], and for multilevel
checkpointing solutions [3].
6 Conclusion
For future extreme-scale HPC systems, designers will be required to work within
tight constraints of cost, power and reliability to achieve greater performance.
The use of design patterns enables the exploration of alternative solutions for a
specific context and provides a framework to combine individual patterns into
complete solutions. The performance and reliability models for resilience design
patterns presented in this paper allow us to develop measures to analyze the
solutions built using the patterns. While these models for the architecture pat-
terns are not detailed enough and refining them will lead to considerable added
complexity, they predict the implications of selecting specific combination of
patterns for the reliability and performance of a system in a given context. The
models developed in this paper are designed to be useful for simulation frame-
works to examine the effectiveness of a resilience solution for specific fault models
and fault rates, as well as to measure the performance and reliability character-
istics of the pattern-based solution for different system architectures, software
environments and application workloads.
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